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Introduction: 
It is the best of times for the Canadian oil and gas industry. As natural gas and 
crude oil prices have risen, upstream petroleum companies have seen their profits and 
stock value increase dramatically( Globe and Mail 12 May 2003, B5;  Scott Haggett, 
Calgary Herald, 13 March 2004, A1).  Domestic exploration is at unprecedented levels 
and investment in conventional and non-conventional oil and gas production has reached 
unprecedented heights.  
But the issues facing the oilpatch have changed dramatically from earlier years. 
Far from concerns about industrial expansion and transportation of ever larger amounts of 
energy to foreign markets which characterized the heyday of the industry, new concern 
about the impact of the Kyoto Protocol, demands for greater environmental controls, 
overseas competition, market access, and increasing fiscal scrutiny have been augmented 
by concerns over skilled labour shortages, aboriginal land claims, regulatory reform and 
growing consumer unrest at a high fuel costs. This new agenda indicates the start if not 
the completion of a shift in the Canadian oil and gas sector – a transition that can be 
described as development from a staples to a mature, and perhaps even some aspects of a 
post-staples, industry.  
While the current set of problems facing the oilpatch are important they reflect an 
industry which has matured and found its place within an advanced industrial economy. 
There was no sudden break with the traditional staples model of development which 
characterized the post-World War II evolution of Canada’s petroleum sector. Instead, the 
transition has taken decades, beginning with the realization in the 1960s that Canada and 
especially the western sedimentary basin contained a finite amount of conventional crude 
oil and natural gas reserves. It has culminated in a technologically advanced, capital 
intensive industry with secure and expanding markets. 
 
The Canadian Oilpatch: From Conventional to Unconventional Sources of Energy 
Canadian oil production in 2004 amounted to 3.08 million barrels per day or 
3.8% per cent of the world’s total petroleum production. Of this national total, 70 per cent 
of production is located in Alberta. Alberta produced 1.6 billion barrels (bbl) of 
conventional crude in 2003. Over the last several years the production of conventional 
crude has declined by about 5 per cent. But as the production of conventional crude oil 
has decreased, non-conventional production has increased. The western sedimentary 
basin has the largest oil sands resources in the world. It is estimated that approximately 
174 bbl of crude are recoverable from the oil sands with today’s technology with 
estimates of 315 billion barrels of potential resources.  
Located in Alberta and Saskatchewan, oil production from raw bitumen – the oil 
sands and heavy oil – exceeded conventional oil production for the first time in 2001. In 
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2003, Alberta produced 965,000 barrels per day from the oil sands. Canadian reserves 
compare very favourably with Saudi Arabian reserves estimated to be at 261.1 (bb) 
(Alberta Energy and Utilities Board, 2004, 50-51). At the end of 2003 only 2 per cent of 
established crude bitumen reserves had been produced. These figures have only recently 
been considered in totals of world reserves either by the International Energy Agency but 
are not part of the United States Department of Energy or the BP Amoco annual surveys 
of world supplies.  
Since the mid 1970s there has been a continual decline in Canada’s conventional 
reserves of crude oil. With reserves estimated at an ultimate potential at 19.7 (bb) and 
annual production of 893,000 barrels per day in 2000, at current rates of production 
Alberta’s supplies of conventional crude will run out sometime around 2060. With any 
increasing demand for oil in the next decade, however, Alberta’s conventional reserves 
are likely to deplete long before this date. While conventional oil production will 
continue to decline, the provincial energy regulatory agency, the Alberta Energy and 
Utilities Board (EUB) estimates that production of bitumen will triple by 2011. This 
figure would account for as much as 75 per cent of Alberta’s total oil supply. 
Approximately $65(cdn) billion of investment has been announced for the oil sands since 
1996. This investment would double current production of oil in Alberta and 
Saskatchewan. Moreover, at the current rate of depletion of 605,000 (bdp) there are 
approximately 1431 years of production left in the tar sands. Although significant for 
domestic and North American production, the total ultimate reserves of heavy oil and the 
tar sands would extend current world consumption patterns less than a decade beyond 
current estimates. The future of the western sedimentary basin’s oil and gas industry rests 
with the production of oil from bitumen reserves.(Alberta Energy and Utilities, 2004, 50-
51).   
Natural gas reserves in Alberta are estimated at 40 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of 
marketable reserves. New drilling has not replaced natural gas production since 1982, and 
in 2003 production outstripped additions by about 4 per cent (Alberta Energy and 
Utilities Board, 2004 52). Natural gas reserve estimates do not include coalbed methane, 
which the Alberta Energy and Utilities Board believes has the potential to add 
significantly to Canada’s reserves. If this projection is correct gas supply could be revised 
upward by a considerable amount.  
The price of a barrel of oil in Alberta is determined in the global market and is 
measured in United States dollars at the benchmark West Texas Intermediate (WTI) price 
level. Oil prices  fluctuated between $50 - $70U.S. in 2005. At these prices the oil and 
gas industry has an enormous impact upon Alberta’s economy. In 2003-04 the oipatch 
generated $8 billion in royalties and other taxes for the province. This was approximately 
40 per cent of total provincial revenues.   Estimated royalties from oil and gas for 2005 
range from $7 billion to $10 billion. There are approximately 275,000 individuals directly 
employed in the Alberta petroleum industry – about 15 per cent of the provincial 
workforce. As well, the industry spent $45 billion in Alberta in 2004. The Alberta oil and 
gas industry also contributes to Canada’s trade surplus – especially with the United States 
(Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers, 2004, 1) 1 
There are approximately 215,000 individuals directly employed in the Canadian 
petroleum industry. Canada-wide about 231,000 additional jobs have been created to 
provide goods and services for the industry. This total includes both service sector and 
manufacturing employment. The Canadian oil and gas industry also contributes to 
Canada’s trade surplus. Although exports of petroleum products – mainly to the United 
States – are partly offset by crude oil imports into the eastern provinces, Canada still 
produces more oil and gas than it consumes. Natural gas is the largest component of 
Canada’s energy exports. In 2001 it accounted for 67 per cent of net energy exports or 
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$24.6 billion (Cdn). Crude oil, natural gas liquids, and petroleum products accounted for 
24 per cent or $8.7 billion (Cdn) in 2001. (National Energy Board, 2002, 10).  
Non-conventional reserves, the Atlantic Offshore and the North  are now the 
focus of energy planning in Canada (the later two are discussed in Clancy’s contribution 
to this volume). Although Canada’s conventional reserves of oil and natural gas in the 
Western Sedimentary basin are in decline and are expected to be depleted within 40 
years, heavy oil and the tar sands will allow the oilpatch to maintain and expand current 
levels of production, investment and employment. Supply projections indicate that total 
Canadian conventional crude oil reserves will be substantially depleted by 2025. Since 
1994, light crude production has increased in British Columbia and Saskatchewan, 
remained constant in Manitoba and decline by approximately 4 per cent a year in Alberta. 
Because Alberta accounts for 75 per cent of total production of light crude the combined 
effect on the Western Sedimentary basin has been a decrease in production of about 3 per 
cent a year.  
The other major reserves of oil and gas include the Northern Frontier, the Scotian 
Shelf and the East Coast Frontier. The Northern Frontier includes the Mackenzie/ 
Beaufort and Arctic Islands. Estimates for natural gas in the Mackenzie/ Beaufort are 9 
tcf of discovered resources and 55 tcf of undiscovered potential in natural gas and 161 
million cubic metres (m3). The Arctic islands and other areas are estimated to contain 15 
tcf of discovered and 90 of undiscovered resources of natural gas and 65 (m3). The 
Scotian Shelf (Sable Island) has estimated reserves of 3 tcf and discovered reserves of 2 
tcf of natural gas and 11 (m3) in oil. The East Coast Frontier of the Grand Banks and 
Labrador contain 9 tcf of natural gas and 251 (m3) in oil reserves (National Energy 
Board, 1999, 62-64).  
 
The Evolution of the  Canadian Oil and Gas Industry 
The oil and gas industry likes to think of itself as national in scope. The theme of 
the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers (CAPP) 2002 Annual General Meeting 
was the Canadian Industry. Three premiers attended the annual general meeting and 
dinner: Stephen Kakfwi of the Northwest Territories, Gordon Campbell of British 
Columbia, and Ralph Klein of Alberta. Premier John Hamm of Nova Scotia sent a video 
message. Each speaker described the oil and gas industry in Canada-wide terms. 
Nevertheless, the fact that the CAPP meeting was held in Calgary indicates the 
importance of Calgary and Alberta to the oil and gas industry in Canada. Despite an 
increase in production in the East Coast Offshore, Saskatchewan, British Columbia, and 
the north, Alberta still dominates the industry.  
The history of Canada’s oil and gas industry reveals a struggle between 
competing levels of government for control of the provincial petroleum industry. Under 
section 109 of the Constitution Act 1867, the provinces have jurisdictional authority over 
natural resources. But the Constitution  also assigns jurisdiction over interprovincial and 
international trade as well as other powers to the federal government and Ottawa has used 
its authority to play a significant role in the oilpatch. The best known example of federal 
involvement in the oil and gas sector was the 1980 National Energy Program. Although 
Ottawa continued to play a significant role in the oilpatch through its regulatory agency, 
the National Energy Board, deregulation in the mid 1980s diminished its presence in the 
oilpatch. The announcement that the Kyoto Protocol will be ratified and implemented, 
however, signaled a renewed federal presence in the Alberta petroleum industry. 
Ottawa’s efforts to re-regulate the oil and gas industry through an international 
environmental treaty has caused a federal-provincial debate over jurisdiction of natural 
resources and the federal government’s international treaty obligations. This time, 
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however, Ottawa has pursued a type of horizontal environmental regulation as opposed to 
the more traditional sectoral regulation. While the effects of this type of rule making 
authority remain uncertain, it is clear that federal-provincial conflict will continue 
(Doern, 1999, 82-97).  
The history of the industry can be divided in four different phases: the semi-
colonial period of 1867-1930; the era of multinational domination, 1930-1969; the 
withdrawal of the multi-nationals and the Canadianization of the industry, 1969-1985; 
and a fourth, current, era in the evolution of Canada’s oil and natural gas industry 
beginning with the switch to non-conventional oil recovery, the rise of natural gas as the 
dominant segment of the industry and the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement which 
guaranteed a reliable market for Canada’s oil and natural gas  The re-entry of the federal 
government into the provincial oil and gas industry through the Kyoto Protocol has 
challenged the free-market continentalism that has dominated the Canadian oilpatch since 
the mid 1980s and the beginning of a new phase of environmental regulation in the 
industry.  
Several other studies of the oil and gas industry have examined the history of 
Canada’s oil and gas industry in terms of its historical evolution but always by criteria 
outside the industry. For example, several assessments of Alberta’s oil and gas sector 
have looked at the industry through the perspective of federal-provincial relations, 
(Richards and Pratt, 1979 and Doern and Toner, 1985) while others have viewed the 
industry as a battle between competing elites for control of the industry or as an 
appendage to the federal energy regulatory regime.(Stevenson, 1989).  None have 
examined the industry as a distinct political-economic entity that both influences and is 
influenced by indigenous and exogenous factors in the near traditional pattern of staples 
production inherent in the evolution of many primary industries in Canada.  
 
The Colonial Period  
 
The first registered oil company in North America was established in Woodstock, 
Ontario in 1850. Earth oil, as petroleum was then called, was used as an illuminate. By 
the 1870s there were approximately 18 refineries in Ontario. With the rise of the internal 
combustion engine – especially the decision of the Royal Navy to switch from coal to oil 
– the demand for petroleum in Canada increased dramatically. In the early 20th century 
Canada relied on imported oil for more than 90 percent of its needs. This dependency on 
imported oil led to a number of discoveries such as Turner Valley southwest of Calgary 
in 1914 and Norman Wells in the Northwest Territories in 1920. But the high cost and 
engineering difficulties of bringing oil and natural gas from the Canadian west and north 
to market, encouraged Canadian petroleum companies to rely on imports.  
The early days of Canada’s petroleum industry are characterized by federal 
control and neglect. Under sections 92 and 109 of the Constitution Act 1867 provincial 
governments are given control over natural resources, but between 1869 when Canada 
assumed control of the Hudson Bay lands in the prairie west and 1930 – 25 years after the 
creation of Alberta and Saskatchewan and the formalization of Manitoba’s provincial 
boundaries – the federal government retained control over natural resources on the prairie 
provinces. The introduction of the Dominion Lands Act in 1872 provided the legal 
framework for federal control of natural resources in the Northwest Territories and in the 
provinces of Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba after 1905.(Breen, 1993, ch.1). After 
years of lobbying and protest over this semi-colonial status, the prairie provinces were 
given control over their natural resources in 1930.   
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The Era of Multinational Domination 
 
The rapid depletion of oil and gas reserves continued after jurisdiction over 
natural resources was transferred to the prairie provinces in 1930. In an attempt to curb 
the rapacious depletion of known reserves, the United Farmers of Alberta government 
established the Turner Valley Conservation Board in 1932. Because of fierce opposition 
from local producers the Turner Valley Board was disbanded within months. When the 
Turner Valley Royalites No.1 struck oil in 1936 it became the largest oilfield in the 
British Commonwealth. Finally in 1938 at the instigation of Imperial Oil and other major 
producers, the Social Credit government of William Aberhart created the Oil and Gas 
Conservation Board to regulate the industry. Modeled after conservation commissions in 
Oklahoma and Texas and in keeping with the radical agrarian ideology of the early Social 
Credit government, the Board was an attempt to end the competition between Imperial 
Oil and the small local producers. Each side recognized that some form of regulation was 
necessary if the life of the field was to be expanded and recovery rates and profits were to 
be maximized (Breen, 125 and Pratt and Richards,55-58).  
After Aberhart’s death in 1943, his successor Ernest Manning encouraged 
multinational companies to develop Alberta’s petroleum reserves as quickly as possible. 
At its peak during World War II, the Turner Valley well produced 30,000 barrels of oil 
per day. The secure and plentiful supply of gasoline from the field was one reason the 
Commonwealth air crews trained in the Calgary area during the Second World War .  
In the post-war period, however, Turner Valley was in decline and the future of 
Alberta’s petroleum sector looked bleak. No new finds of commercial value had been 
discovered in several years And Imperial Oil, the Canadian subsidiary of Standard Oil of 
New Jersey, had decided to discontinue its exploration programme in the Western 
Sedimentary Basin. Then on 13 February 1947, the Leduc No.1 well was hit. Combined 
with the establishment of the Oil and Gas Conservation Board, the Leduc created the 
conditions for the entry of  multinational petroleum companies – mainly but not 
exclusively American, corporations – into Alberta. For the next twenty years, the Social 
Credit government actively encourage the development of Alberta’s oil and gas reserves 
through the multinationals at the expense of smaller Canadian firms.   
The production side of Alberta’s oil and gas industry in the 1950s and 1960s was 
dominated by the Canadian representatives of the “Seven Sisters,”  the large, vertically 
integrated,  multi-national oil and gas companies. They included Royal Dutch/Shell, 
British Petroleum, Imperial/Exon, Texaco, Gulf, Standard Oil of California, and Mobil. 
Four of these firms operated in Canada – Shell, Imperial/Exxon, Gulf and Texaco. These 
Canadian Sisters were referred to as the “Big Four”  and dominated the Canadian oil 
market; while also having significant interests in the natural gas sector. 
At the beginning of the 1950s Canadian oil and gas producers were lobbying the 
federal government to protect them from low priced foreign imports. The Diefenbaker 
government appointed Henry Borden to examine Canada’s energy situation. The Borden 
Inquiry discovered a conflict between the multinational oil companies – the so-called 
seven sisters represented in Canada by Shell, Imperial/Exxon, Gulf and Texaco – and 
local producers. The Canadian subsidiaries of the big four were the biggest producers of 
Canadian oil and gas, but they had little interest in shipping Alberta crude to central and 
eastern Canada. Through their multi-national parents, the big four provided their 
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refineries in the Montreal area with cheap imported oil. There was very little incentive to 
sell expensive Alberta oil to consumers in Ontario and Quebec.  
Alberta producers wanted secure markets. Because various restrictions kept them 
out of the United States, their only options were central and eastern Canada. The local 
companies wanted a more efficient pipeline than the existing Interprovincial line to 
Ontario and they wanted a tariff on imported oil. What the Alberta producers got was a 
compromise. The federal government erected an oil barrier at the Ottawa Valley line. 
Markets west of the line were reserved for Alberta oil while those east of the Ottawa river 
would continue to rely on inexpensive imported oil and gas. This National Oil Policy was 
introduced in 1960 at the same time as the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) was established in order to prevent the seven sisters from driving oil 
and gas prices any lower in major producing states, mainly in the middle east ( Foster, 
1979, 27-31).   
By the mid 1950s it was determined that Alberta’s reserves of natural gas were 
sufficient to supply markets on the west coast and in central Canada. Three major 
pipelines were constructed in this period to ship these reserves to market. The largest is 
Trans Canada Pipelines (TCPL). Created by the federal government in the late 1950s, 
TCPL was designed to bring Alberta gas to markets in Central Canada. Although 
subsidized and partially constructed b y the federal government, TCPL was a privately 
held corporation. Incorporation of TCPL indicated an interest by the federal government 
in Alberta’s stock of natural gas and oil. This was the first major federal incursion into 
the oilpatch since it had ceded control over natural resources to the prairie provinces in 
1930.  
The Alberta Gas Trunk Line (AGTL) was incorporated by the province in 1954 
to act as a common carrier for natural gas. Its purpose was to stabilize the price of natural 
gas and assure consumers. Voting shares in the new provincial enterprise were distributed 
among the Alberta’s utilities, the gas processors, export interests, and the government, 
while non-voting shares were made available to Alberta residents. Although AGTL was 
funded by the province, control was vested in the hands of the natural gas processors and 
the utilities. While the public-private partnership reflected Ernest Manning’s aversion to 
Crown corporations and his faith in the private sector, it allowed the province a window 
into the industry as well as an advantage over the federal government’s renewed interest 
in Alberta’s petroleum reserves. (Breen, 1993, 403-407 and Bregha, 1979).   
The third major pipeline built in the 1950s was Frank McMahon’s Westcoast 
Transmission. Designed to transport natural gas to the pacific coast of British Columbia 
and eventually to U.S. markets, the Westcoast project met with federal, provincial and 
American resistance (Breen, 1993, 391. Despite numerous regulatory and political 
obstacles, however, approval was given to the scheme in November 1955. 
By the late 1960s conventional reserves were declining. The Big Four 
transnational oil companies were looking to areas outside the province for new reserves. 
With the enormous find of Prudhoe on the Alaskan north slope in 1968, many in the 
oilpatch believed Canada’s oil and gas future would be found in the Arctic region – the 
Mackenzie Delta, the Beaufort Sea and the Arctic Islands. As a consequence, wildcat 
drilling in Alberta – exploration away from known reserves – dropped by 40 percent 
between 1969-71. In the same period, Alberta’s share of exploration dropped from three 
quarters of the Canadian total to just over half. By the early 1970s the Big Four had come 
to the conclusion that there were no more large deposits of oil or gas – what the industry 
calls elephants – to be found in Alberta. Their focus was now on the frontier areas of the 
Arctic and overseas.  
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The Nationalization of Oil and Gas 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s a number of circumstances combined to alter 
the structure of Canada’s oil and gas industry. After the Big Four had decided to abandon 
the province for other locations, the exploration side of the business was left to the 
smaller multi-nationals as well as to a number of emerging Canadian-owned companies. 
Although there had always been Canadian companies in the Alberta oilpatch, their 
numbers and size had been small. As the 1960s ended, 98 per cent of the provincial oil 
and gas industry was foreign – mainly American – controlled. This was the result of 
several factors. The first was that the foreign firms had the capital and the expertise to 
develop the oil and gas reserves found in Canada. Second, the Alberta Social Credit 
government actively encourage foreign multinationals. Not only did Manning believe that 
the multi-nationals provided the easiest and quickest way to develop the province’s 
petroleum reserves, there was still a residual populist resent against central Canada within 
the ruling Social Credit party. As a result, Manning actively discouraged Canadian 
corporations based in Ontario and Quebec while encouraging foreign owned capital to 
invest. The result had been a domination of the industry by a few large multi-national oil 
and gas companies. There was little room left for small Canadian firms to get a start in 
the industry. That is, until the multi-nationals began to pull back their operations in the 
1960s.  
Two Alberta-based oil and gas companies came to prominence in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s.  Alberta Gas Trunk Line and Dome were the flagship Canadian oil and 
gas companies of an emerging domestic industry. They reflected a shift in policies both at 
the provincial and federal level that emphasized security supplies of oil and gas and a 
Canadian controlled industry – traditional concerns of a staples industry. As a private-
public corporation created by the province, AGTL, under the leadership of Bob Blair, 
increased its role in the pipeline business and became an active participant in the 
exploration and production side of the oil and gas industry. Guided by Jack Gallagher and 
Robert Wright, Dome began as a small start-up dependent on the majors for its survival 
to play a significant role in frontier exploration and in conventional oil and gas 
production in Alberta. Because of its interest in the Beaufort Sea,  Dome’s agenda 
complimented the federal government’s efforts to increases domestic supplies of oil and 
gas while at the same time increasing Canadian control of the industry.  
The withdrawal of the multinational oil and gas companies from Alberta in the 
late 1960s paved the way for a political change in Alberta. In August 1971 the 
Progressive Conservative led by Peter Lougheed defeated the 36-year-old Social Credit 
government. One of the reasons for the Social Credit defeat was concern that Alberta was 
not receiving its fair share of oil and gas revenues. Manning and his successor Harry 
Strom had allowed the multinationals to exploit reserves as quickly as possible for a 
minimum return to the government in royalties and taxes. The Social Credit government 
placed minimum controls on the multinationals. Royalty rates were reviewed only once 
every ten year, the multi-nationals were consulted on any change to government policy, 
and Canadian investment was actively discouraged. Manning saw his role as providing a 
stable political environment for the foreign-based industry. Lougheed , on the other hand, 
was suspicious of big oil. He understood that the interests of the multinationals did not 
necessarily coincide with those of the province. While he was willing to offer incentives 
to smaller Canadian companies, he did not advocate a policy of rapid depletion of 
conventional reserves by the large foreign-based oil and gas companies. Lougheed’s 
campaign focused on the problem of what do when the oil and gas ran out – on what a 
post-staples Alberta would be (Foster, 1979, 38-41).   
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After negotiating a royalty increase on oil and price increases for natural gas, 
Lougheed asserted Alberta’ position as the centre of Canada’s petroleum industry. In 
1972, the federal government began to exhibit a new interest in western Canadian 
petroleum. The price of a barrel of oil increased $.40U.S. in 1972 from $3U.S. Although 
this was an insignificant increase from a very low price compared to current rates, it was 
enough to startle the federal Liberal government of Pierre Trudeau. With world prices for 
oil and natural gas increasing, the federal government realized that it could keep down 
the price of Alberta crude much more easily than it could the cost of imported oil from 
South America and the Middle East. Lougheed resisted any incursion by the federal 
government into what he argued was exclusive provincial jurisdiction over natural 
resources.  
The debate between the Alberta and federal governments over energy pricing had 
a sudden shift in October 1973 with the OPEC oil embargo called in response to Western, 
especially United States, support for Israel in the Yom Kippur War. OPEC cut-off 
shipments of crude oil to the West. Suddenly the price of a barrel of crude oil shot up 
from approximately $3U.S. per barrel WTI to over $12 per barrel WTI. The OPEC oil 
shock of 1973 sent the multi-nationals scrambling to find secure supplies of crude and 
natural gas. One obvious location was Alberta. The price jump in oil was an incentive for 
the return of the multinationals to the Alberta oilpatch.  
In 1974 the federal government, feeling it needed a better window on the oil and 
gas sector, and inspired by Canadian nationalists, created a state-owned oil company, 
Petro-Canada. Petro-Can was resented by both oilpatch veterans and the provincial 
government. The oilpatch had a self-image of rugged individualism and any state 
incursion was resented as an unnecessary impediment on their God-given right to drill, 
produce and market oil and natural gas (House, 1980). Embarrassed by statements made 
by the minister of natural resources Joe Greene, in the House of Commons in June 1971 
who had stated that Canada had a 923 year supply of oil and 392 for gas (Foster, 1979, 
51). and caught by surprise by the OPEC embargo in October 1973, the federal 
government believed it necessary to create a national oil and gas company that would 
promote a variety of national goals. These goals included increased domestic ownership 
of the industry, development of reserves not located in the western provinces, that is to 
say, the promotion of the Canada Lands in the north and offshore, better information 
about the petroleum industry, security of supply, decrease dependence on the large multi-
national oil corporations, especially the Big Four, and increase revenues flowing to the 
federal treasury from the oil and gas sector (John Erik Fossum, 1997). These goals were 
very similar to those of state-owned corporations in other countries but they were 
controversial in Canada (Fjell, 2000).  
Federal incursions into the oil and gas sector were resented by the Alberta 
government. Lougheed had committed his government to economic diversification 
through increased oil and gas revenues. Any attempt to decrease these revenues or 
interfere in any way with Alberta’s efforts to create a viable post-oil and gas economy 
were strongly resented. The ensuing struggle to set a policy direction for the oilpatch 
resulted in a lack a coherence. Instead, of working toward maximization of revenues and 
recovery and planning for a post-oil economy, the two levels of government were in a 
continuous conflict over the direction and control of the industry (Fossum,  1997, 10).  
A second oil shock came with the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Although the 
overthrow of the Shah of Iran was widely welcomed by the Iranian people, the revolution 
was soon overtaken by Islamist fundamentalist who hatred of the West was profound. 
The Iranian revolutionaries simply stopped oil exports to the west. After the seizure of 
the United States Embassy and the taking of American hostages by state-sponsored 
protestors in Tehran in 1979, the U.S. imposed economic sanctions, froze Iranian assets 
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in the United States, and prohibited the import of Iranian oil into the U.S. Oil and gas 
prices increased dramatically rising from just under $20U.S. a barrel to $40U.S. There 
was the expectation that petroleum prices would go much higher. 
The response of the federal government to the shock was to increase state 
involvement in the provision of energy. As part of a National Energy Program (NEP), the 
federal government offered incentives for drilling in the Canada lands (the Arctic and the 
offshore under federal jurisdiction), increased export taxes on oil and gas, and offered a 
variety of “off-oil” measures in an effort to conserve domestic oil and gas reserves while 
decreasing dependence on foreign energy supplies.  Although a number of domestic 
companies benefitted from the federal initiatives, the NEP was strongly resented by the 
oilpatch and  the oil producing provinces.  
After a series of negotiations between the producing provinces and the federal 
government an agreements was reached concerning pricing and taxation. As well, Alberta 
and the other producing provinces were able to secure an amendment to the existing 
constitutional division of powers which strengthened provincial control over natural 
resources. But the constitutional amendments and negotiations with the federal 
government maintained the basic structure of the NEP.  
During the NEP exploration and drilling in the Northwest Territories and the 
Atlantic Offshore met with some success. There were discoveries of natural gas in the 
Beaufort Sea and in the Arctic Islands. But high development costs and the distance from 
markets combined with concerns over Aboriginal land claims and the effect of 
development on the indigenous population have delayed exploitation of the northern 
reserves.  
With the approval of the federal government, oil exploration in the Atlantic 
Offshore had began with the first deep well off Prince Edward Island in 1943. Mobil was 
given a licence to drill off Sable Island in 1959 and began seismic testing in 1960. 
Natural gas and oil were found in the Nova Scotia Offshore in the 1970s. These finds 
included the Panuke-Cohasset fields which were put into production in 1992 and the 
Sable Island natural gas field came into production in 1999. In the late 1970s oil was 
discovered in the Newfoundland Offshore in 1979 in the Hibernia field and in 1984 in the 
Terra Nova field. Hiberenia began producing large volumes of oil in 1997 while Terra 
Nova started producing commercial quantities of oil in 2000. The Atlantic Offshore has 
estimated reserves of 159,634 mm3 of crude oil and 67,083 million cubic metres of 
natural gas (Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers, 2000). 
During the 1970s and 1980s the Trudeau government faced pressure to transfer 
the Offshore to the provinces. The federal government compromised by offering to pool 
revenues until the provinces no longer qualified for equalization payments. In 1982 Nova 
Scotia agreed to this arrangement. Newfoundland held out for better terms and 
challenged federal Offshore jurisdiction in court. References were made to both the 
Newfoundland Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court ruled that 
Newfoundland had no right to exploit the Offshore  resources or to make laws affecting 
them.  
 
The Era of Benign Neglect 
 
Two events in the mid-1980s greatly affected the Canadian oil and gas industry. 
First, the election of a Progressive Conservative government under the leadership of 
Brian Mulroney in September 1984 altered the political situation. With a strong western 
and Atlantic contingent in the caucus and cabinet, the new Mulroney government was 
sympathetic to the demands of the western and Atlantic oil and gas producing provinces 
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to dismantle the NEP and to allow some provincial control over the Offshore to 
Newfoundland and Nova Scotia. After years of negotiations between the federal 
government and the Atlantic provinces, the Mulroney government in Ottawa signed an 
Atlantic Accord with the east coast provinces in 1985. The Atlantic Accord allowed 
Newfoundland and the Maritime provinces responsibility in the development of the 
Offshore and a share in the revenues. While retaining ownership of the Offshore, the 
federal government reached an agreement with Newfoundland in 1985 over Hibernia and 
other Offshore fields while the Canada-Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Board was 
established in 1988 to administer the Hibernia and Terra Nova fields – the Canada-
Newfoundland-Canada Offshore Petroleum Board and the Nova Scotia - Canada 
Offshore Petroleum Board. 2  
 The signing of the Western Accord with the western provinces in April 1985 
dismantled the National Energy Program. But the end of the NEP failed to revive the 
Canadian oil and gas industry. World energy prices collapsed in 1986. Oil sold for 
approximately $12U.S. per barrel and natural gas fell to $1U.S.(mcf). In the Alberta 
oilpatch thousands of workers were laid-off, northern frontier exploration was halted and 
the Atlantic Offshore was curtailed. The federal government’s response to the decline in 
oil and gas prices was one of benign neglect. Provincial revenues shrunk and Alberta 
faced a series of budget deficits as thousands of workers were dismissed. Investment in 
Alberta’s oil and gas industry had come to a halt.  
While the Western Accord ended the federal government’s active involvement in 
the petroleum industry, the Foreign Investment Review Agency (FIRA) – a product of the 
1972-74 Trudeau government’s efforts to protect domestic industry from foreign control 
– was also dismantled by the Mulroney government and Canada was declared “open for 
business.” The questions of Canadian ownership and maintaining security of supply were 
no longer a concern of federal energy policy. Instead, Ottawa relied on low prices and the 
unfettered market to supply Canadian demand for inexpensive oil and gas. With the 
signing of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in 1988 and its implementation 
in 1989, restrictions were put in place on state intervention in the oil and gas sector. 
Simply put, under the terms of the FTA Canada could no longer give preference to 
Canadians. U.S. markets and businesses were to be treated the same as domestic 
consumers and companies. The subsidized price and other benefits given to Canadian 
producers and consumers through the NEP ended. This arrangement fit the ideological 
predisposition of the Mulroney government in Ottawa and the producing provinces. The 
new federal Liberal government’s  ratification of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) in late 1993, further restricted the ability of the federal and 
provincial governments to determine pricing and secure the supply of oil and gas for 
domestic markets.  
 The oil and gas industry in Canada was now integrated into the North American 
markets. Although provincial royalty exemptions and tax expenditures continued to 
subsidize the oilpatch, the post-Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement and NAFTA era in 
the Canadian petroleum industry saw an end of attempts to insulate Canadian consumers 
from the vagaries of market forces. Federal government price controls had been removed 
from oil pricing and provincial efforts to use revenues from the industry to diversify the 
economy had come to an end. Always subject to the boom-and-bust cycle, the producing 
provinces and territories were now even more dependent on international markets. When 
prices for oil and gas rose, the provincial and territorial economies surged; when prices 
declined, oil and gas companies cut back on exploration and production with provincial 
and territorial revenues following the downward trend. In Alberta, the Klein government 
continued the policy of royalty holidays and various tax expenditures to encourage 
further exploration and production especially in the tar sands. Designed to encourage
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exploration and production, the royalty structure in the Atlantic Offshore was very 
generous to the various petroleum companies. Exploration activity in the Mackenzie 
Delta and the Beaufort Sea resumed in the late 1990s. Extensive geophysical and well-
drilling programs have been in place since 2000. As well, exploration and production 
activities began in the 2001 in the southern Northwest Territories near Fort Laird. The 
economic feasibility of these Northern projects was assured by an expanding pipeline 
system in northern Alberta and a projected shortage of natural gas in the North American 
markets.3  
.  
 
The New NEP and Kyoto 
This scenario of a classic mature staples industry expanding to support increases 
in demand in internatinal markets changed in December 1997 when the Government of 
Canada signed the Kyoto Protocol on atmospheric emissions. The Kyoto Accord 
mandates the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs) to below levels found in 
1990. GHGs are primarily carbon dioxide emissions (CO2), methane and nitrous oxide. 
These gases  are generally agreed to be a major contributor to global warming. 
Greenhouse gases are caused by the burning of carbon based fuels such as oil, natural 
gas, and coal. Ratified in late 2002, the Kyoto Protocol binds Canada to a 6 per cent 
reduction of 1990 emissions between 2008-12. The Protocol “stipulates that progress in 
achieving this reduction commitment will be measured through the use of a set of 
internationally agreed-to emissions and removals inventory methodologies and reporting 
guidelines” (Olsen et al. 2002, iii). The implementation strategy was released the same 
month. (Canada)  
Through the Alberta, Newfoundland, and Nova Scotia  governments and several 
industry organizations, the Canadian oil and gas industry has expressed its dislike of the 
agreement (Rodrigues, 2002). In September 2002, the Alberta government launched a 
$1.5 million advertising campaign designed to weaken public support for the agreement. 
Polling data indicate that the apocalyptic provincial advertising with its warning that 
thousands of jobs may be lost and living standards lowered has been successful. A 
majority of Albertans soon opposed the ratification and implementation of the Kyoto 
Protocol (Chase and  Mahoney, 2002, 1). 
The producing provinces, the various industry groups and the federal government 
had all indicated that Kyoto could not be implemented in its present form. Moreover, the 
U.S. administration of George W. Bush had stated it would not ratify or implement it. 
Any effort to require Canadian industry to reduce greenhouse gas emissions without the 
active participation of the United States would put Canada at a comparative economic 
disadvantage with its largest trading partner. The domestic oil and gas industry believed it 
would suffer a disproportionate burden of the Kyoto effort to reduce greenhouse gases 
(GHGs). Alberta was particularly concerned with the possible effects of the Kyoto 
Protocol. While Alberta’s conventional production of oil and natural gas would be 
affected by the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, the non-conventional oil reserves 
found in the tar sands and in heavy oil would suffer the greatest blow. The costs 
associated with reducing GHGs would fall disproportionately on the non-conventional 
supplies of oil raising recovery costs by as much as $6US per barrel based on the industry 
standard of West Texas Intermediate (WTI) oil from the current $18US. With Middle 
Eastern oil averaging a recovery cost of $6 per barrel WTI, the costs of Kyoto would 
price Alberta non-conventional reserves out of the North American and world markets. 
Billions of dollars in planned investment could be lost and Alberta’s future economic 
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prosperity threatened. In Alberta’s oilpatch comparisons with widely unpopular National 
Energy Program of 1980 abound.  
A few weeks before Prime Minister Chretien’s Johannesburg announcement that 
Canada would ratify the protocol, the situation in Canada’s oil and gas sector had been 
very different. In May 2001, the Bush administration had released its National Energy 
Policy. The Policy – written by the National Energy Policy Advisory Group, chaired by 
the American Vice-President and former Chief Executive Officer of Haliburton Corp. one 
of the largest oil and gas field serve firms in the world, Dick Cheney – called for secure 
supplies of oil and gas for the United States through such mechanisms as enhanced 
recovery, increasing domestic supplies and global alliances (National Energy Policy 
Development Group, 2001). Canada’s deregulated energy sector had become the United 
States largest energy trading partner and leading supplier of natural gas, oil and 
electricity. In 2000 Canada supplied 14 percent of U.S. energy needs through an 
integrated network of pipelines and electricity lines. Canadian energy supplies – 
especially natural gas and oil – were not described as a foreign source of energy but as 
part of the U.S. domestic supply. American recognition of Canada’s importance as a 
source of energy was seen as part of the evolution of an integrated North American 
energy sector. 
While major producing provinces such as Alberta are quite content with the pre-
Kyoto status quo and would like it to return, the federal government has persisted in other 
measures designed to gve it an increased influence over Canadian energy policy in the 
new post-Kyoto world. One such initiative is the North American Energy Working Group 
(NAEWG). The NAEWG is a government-to-government body established to enhance 
the functioning of the North American energy market. Formation of the group was 
announced in 2001 by President Bush, Prime Minister Chretien and Mexican President 
Vincente Fox.  
The NAEWG formally consists of one representative from Canada, the United 
States, and Mexico. Its goal is to provide information and coordinate policy in the three 
North American jurisdictions on energy related matters and to enhance continental 
energy trade within the context of sustainable development (North American Energy 
Working Group, 2002). The NAEWG mandate includes all forms of energy, and their 
transmission, distribution and consumption in North America. The three states are 
pledged to respect the domestic policies, divisions of jurisdictional authority and trade 
obligations of each country.   
When the NAEWG was announced, however, Alberta called an emergency 
meeting of provincial ministers of energy. In response to these perceived federal 
incursions into provincial energy jurisdiction, the Western provincial and territorial 
energy ministers established the Western Energy Alliance. The inaugural meeting was 
held 18 February 2005 in Calgary. Announced at the Western Premiers’ Conference in 
July 2004, the Western Energy Alliance was mandated to “promote the west as a secure 
and sustainable supplier to Canadians and North Americans.” Along with efforts to raise 
awareness of western Canada as a safe and secure supplier of energy and pursue 
harmonization of energy regulation, the 18 February 2005 meeting communique stated 
that the Western Energy Alliance would, communicate “with their Federal counterpart 
regarding a commitment to meaningful provincial and territorial participation in 
international energy discussions and negotiations” (Alberta Energy, 2005). 
Another bilateral agreement  – the Canada-China Energy Working Group – was 
announced by the Prime Minister of Canada Paul Martin and the Premier of China on 20 
January 2005 in Beijing. The current status of the Canada-China Energy Working Group 
is a press release from the Canadian Prime Minister’s Office and several news stories in 
the Chinese media. The announcement did, however,  signal a continuing willingness on 
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the part of the federal government to meddle in Canadian il and gas production and trade 
Two major Chinese oil and gas companies, Sinopec and PetroChina (both state 
corporations) are in the process of investing in Alberta’s oil sands, Enbridge (a pipeline 
with a terminal in Prince Rupert) and Husky Oil. The consequences of Chinese 
investment in Canadian oil and gas could have serious effects on the Canada - United 
States relationship if the Americans view the Chinese interest in Canadian energy as a 
threat to their security.  
The ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, the North-American Energy Working 
Group and the Canada-China Energy Working Group signal a re-entry by the Federal 
government into the oil and gas industry. Unlike the 1980 National Energy Plan, 
however, Ottawa is not seeking to Canadianize the industry, secure oil and gas for 
domestic consumption and industrial advantage, or even share in the profits generated by 
the oilpatch. Instead, it has responded to various internal and external pressures for the 
mitigation of GHGs, trade relations and a world demand for Canada’s petroleum 
resources.  
The industry reaction to these initiatives has been mixed. The large exploration 
and production companies are capable to dealing with mandatory GHG reduction through 
technological innovation and already available practices – several of the larger companies 
such as Royal Dutch/ Shell and BP are already Kyoto compliant in the operations. They 
are also prepared to increase production in the oil sands to meet increasing demand for 
petroleum resources. But the small Canadian producer – production under 1,000 barrel of 
oil equivalent per day (boe) – does not have the knowledge, technology, or fiscal 
capability of meeting Kyoto requirements or trade with China. As well, the small 
producers have been excluded from the oil sands. They are not capable of procuring the 
enormous financial resources necessary for this type of non-conventional exploration and 
production. The depletion of conventional stocks of crude oil and natural gas have pushed 
many small producers into sour gas and methane development – both highly regulated, 
socially controversial and expensive. As a result, small producers, through the Small 
Explorers and Producers Association of Canada – a 400 plus member lobby association – 
have turned to the provincial governments for help. With close political connections with 
several governments in western Canada, the provinces have used this support to express 
their opposition to Kyoto and other federal initiatives in areas they consider to be 
exclusive provincial jurisdiction.  
 
Conclusions: Oil & Gas as Mature Staples Industries at the Edge 
The Canadian oil and gas industry is in a period of change. But what kind of 
change is not clear. The industry is divided between large and small producers and is 
being pulled in two competing and contradictory directions. On the one side are the large 
producers – those corporations producing over 10,000 barrels of oil equivalent per day – 
which are fully integrated into the global market. They have the technology, knowledge 
and financial resources to engage in an internationally competitive industry and develop 
unconventional sources of energy. On the other are the small Canadian producers. They 
lack the resources to meet increasingly rigourous environmental, social and market 
regulations. These corporations and individuals are dependent upon the provinces for 
their survival. Any threat to them such as increased regulation through the Kyoto 
Protocol becomes a federal-provincial issue.  
The multilateralist inclinations of the federal government – its support for the 
Kyoto Protocol, the North American Energy Working Group, and the Canada-China 
Energy Working Group –  conflict with the interests of the producing provinces who are 
dependent on petroleum revenues.  Abandoning its interventionist policies of the 1970s 
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and 1980s, and its benign neglect of the industry in the 1990s, Ottawa has instead now 
adopted pro-active energy-related environmental and trade policies.  
The current federal trade and environmental initiatives are, however,   
fundamentally different from the 1980 NEP. While the National Energy Programme was 
a nationalist enterprise designed to counter the continentalist pull of U.S. markets and 
multinational petroleum companies, Canadian ratification and implementation of the 
Kyoto Protocol is a multilateral approach to the problem of climate change and energy 
demand which are global rather than regional in scope. The result is a new dynamic 
between the continental strategy of the Bush administration and the producing provinces, 
on the one hand, and the post-staples agenda of the federal government.  
The Canadian oil and gas industry is in a state of flux. The Iraq War, American 
continental energy policy, and the Prime Minister’s announcement on ratification and 
implementation of Kyoto, and the energy trade initiatives have contributed to a climate of 
confrontation in the Canadian oilpatch that has not been seen for a generation. Even 
though the producing provinces are enjoying the benefits of high oil and natural gas 
prices, they remain fearful of increased federal intervention in this most lucrative of 
industries. Any attempt by the federal government to re-establish a presence in the 
oilpatch is met with skepticism, if not outright hostility. This reaction reflects the 
divisions within the industry between the small and large producers or between a 
traditional staples industry and the globalized, technology driven international oil and gas 
business of today.   
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ENDNOTES 
 
                                                       
1 The May 2001 United States National Energy Policy has stimulated American 
interest in Alberta’s oil sands as a safe and secure source for oil and other petroleum 
products. The continuing integration of the North American energy markets especially in 
the oil and gas sector is an important factor in the future viability of Alberta’s oil sands 
and heavy oil development. Simply put, Alberta’s oil and gas industry depends on 
increasing production of non-conventional sources of oil and natural gas and access to 
U.S. markets. 
2 While these two administrative tribunals were successful in promoting the 
development and regulation of the Atlantic Offshore, they have not been as successful in 
settling disputes between the Atlantic producing provinces and the federal government or 
between the provinces. There has been, for example, an Offshore boundary dispute 
between Nova Scotia and Newfoundland as well as numerous complaints that the 
provinces have been subject to unfair penalties in their revenue sharing agreements with 
the federal government. Under existing royalty sharing agreements, the federal 
government has deducted equalization payments from the two provinces in proportion to 
the Offshore petroleum royalties collected. Through its “Campaign for Fairness,” Nova 
Scotia has waged a consistent battle with the federal government to have petroleum 
royalties excluded from the calculation of equalization payments. So far, the federal 
government has resisted Nova Scotia’s request. 
3 Several producers groups have announced feasibility studies on a major natural 
gas pipeline from the Mackenzie Delta. Unlike the earlier attempt to construct a northern 
pipeline this proposal has the support of the Northwest territories government and the 
Aboriginal community. A consortium of oil and gas companies with interests in the 
Alaskan north slope have announced a proposal to bring natural gas to North American 
markets through a pipeline along the arctic coast – the North Slope – of Alaska and a 
third group has proposed a natural gas pipeline along the Alaska Highway. The Bush 
administration and the U.S. Congress have proposed loan guarantees and other non-cash 
measure worth $20(US) billion as incentives for the construction of Arctic shore and the 
Alaska Highway lines (Brethour, 2003, B7 and Haggett, 2003, D2) 
